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INTRODUCTION
Picture this. You have been in contact with a local community college
regarding an idea you have for a new degree program. You have created the
program materials using knowledge and skills you have acquired during your
academic studies and adult life. The college becomes interested in
implementing your degree program into its curriculum and offers to purchase
the program materials from you. Enter the possible dilemma. You are a public
school kindergarten through twelfth grade (K-12) teacher and your employer,
the public school,1 is determined it has copyright ownership over the degree
program materials under the work made for hire doctrine of the Copyright Act
of 1976 (the 1976 Act).2
Should such situation come to litigation, the outcome would hinge on a
court’s interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine. It is generally known
that traditional materials, such as lesson plans, created by teachers specifically
for use in their classrooms fall within the scope of a teacher’s employment 3
and, thus, are owned by the institutions that employ the teachers. However,
less clear are nontraditional works, such as degree program materials created
by teachers to sell to other institutions. In the realm of teacher-created works,
some have argued that a “teacher exception” exists that prevents employers
from asserting ownership over teacher-created works based on the works
made for hire doctrine. Though scholars have weighed in on the exception’s
existence over the years, the courts have still not provided a clear answer. In
either case, exception’s strength is not reliable, and teachers should turn to
other options if they wish to maintain ownership over their nontraditional
educational works.
This comment will begin with a discussion of the treatment of the work
made for hire doctrine as it relates to teacher-created works, beginning with
the doctrine’s creation in the 1909 Copyright Act, its modification by the
Copyright Act of 1976, and its current treatment today. Weaved throughout
this history of the doctrine is a discussion about the so-called “teacher
exception.” This comment also discusses the views of three scholars, Russ
1. This comment focuses on the relationship between public school K-12 teachers and their
public school employers. Though the analysis and recommendations may apply to university faculty,
they were developed particularly with K-12 teachers in mind. Much of this comment also applies to
the private sector, but when collective bargaining is discussed, it should be noted that collective
bargaining rights vary for private sector employees and employers, and thus, they deserve a different
analysis not covered by this paper.
2. The works made for hire provision states, “[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
3. See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
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VerSteeg, Nathanial S. Strauss, and Ashley Packard, who have each
commented on the existence of the teacher exception. Their articles were
published over several years and their arguments strengthen the overarching
theme of this article. That is, the teacher exception cannot be relied on, and,
based on what seems to be a trend of ending or restricting collective
bargaining of public employees, teachers must rely on other options to
maintain copyright ownership of their works. The final section discusses some
of those options.
I. STATE OF THE LAW
The work made for hire doctrine has undergone several changes since its
enactment. These changes have included not only explicit changes to the
language of the doctrine in the Copyright Act, but also implicated the way
courts have applied the doctrine. Despite these changes, questions still arise
over who owns particular works created by employees. When such employees
are teachers, the questions become even more complicated in light of the socalled “teacher exception.” To answer some of these questions, a look into the
history of the work made for hire doctrine is necessary.
A. History of the Treatment of Intellectual Property Created by Teachers
The work made for hire doctrine, which now asserts that an employer will
assume copyright ownership over works created by an employee during the
scope of his employment and over particular works that were specially
commissioned,4 found its birth in the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act).5
However, at that time, the 1909 Act only commented that “author” “shall
include an employer in the case of works made for hire” and did not define
employees or what qualified as work made for hire.6 During this time, a
principle eventually referred to as the “teacher exception”7 developed, which
carved out an exception to the general work made for hire principle for
teacher-created works. It is believed the teacher exception arose out of the
cases8 of Sherrill v. Grieves9 and Williams v. Weisser.10 Williams, in
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
5. James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers,
Copyrights, Work-For-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 390
(1999).
6. Id.
7. Nathaniel S. Strauss, Anything but Academic: How Copyright’s Work-For-Hire Doctrine
Affects Professors, Graduate Students, and K-12 Teachers in the Information Age, 18 RICH. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 13 (2011) (“In the 1970s, commentators, most notably Professor Melville Nimmer, came to
use the term ‘teacher exception’ to describe the rule established by Sherrill and Williams, arguably
implying it would extend to all types of works by all teachers, including K-12 educators.”).
8. Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The Right of Teacher Inception,
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particular, “became the established common law for all intents and
purposes.”11 In these two cases, the courts found Sherrill, a military instructor,
and Williams, a college professor, and not their employers, owned the
copyright to the lectures they created because of the teacher exception.12
Since Congress’ passage of the 1976 Act, it remains under debate whether
the teacher exception lives on, particularly with reference to K-12 teachers.
The 1976 Act codified the works made for hire doctrine in 17 U. S. C. §
201(b), which states, “the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”13 The codification of
the doctrine did not mention the teacher exception14 and many commentators
are very skeptical of its continued existence.
There is some case law supporting the existence of the exception. Hays v.
Sony Corp. of America15 is frequently cited as the prominent authority
endorsing the continued existence of the “teacher exception.” In Hays, two
high school business course teachers created a manual to instruct students on
how to use the school’s word processors.16 The school employer gave the
manual to Sony and asked Sony to modify it to make it compatible with the
Sony word processors the school had purchased from Sony.17 Sony proceeded
and created a manual almost identical to the original teacher-created manual.18
The teachers, in turn, sued for copyright infringement.19 While the Seventh
Circuit ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the teacher’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, Judge Posner discussed at length the
court’s support of continuing the existence of the teacher exception.20 He
emphasized, “[t]he reasons for a presumption against finding academic
writings to be a work made for hire are as forceful today as they ever were” 21
and that if the court was “forced to decide the issue, [it would] conclude that
75 IOWA L. REV. 381, 393 (1990).
9. 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929).
10. 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
11. Strauss, supra note 7, at 13.
12. Id. at 10–13.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
14. Strauss, supra note 7, at 15.
15. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
16. Id. at 413.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally id.
21. Id. at 416.

MILLS FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

296

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

5/11/2015 11:12 AM

[Vol. 19:2

the exception had survived the enactment of the 1976 Act.”22
B. Commentators Take on the Existence of the Teacher Exception
Despite the Hays precedent, commentators continue to debate whether the
teacher exception continues to exist. This section discusses three scholarly
articles,23 spanning over a period of about twenty years, which vary in opinion
about the exception’s existence, and, as a result, strengthen the argument of
this comment that teachers should not rely on the exception.
Some commentators, such as Russ VerSteeg, find the continued existence
of the teacher exception to be an “open question.”24 In his 1990 article,
VerSteeg emphasizes that Judge Posner’s dicta in Hays is a “valuable tool for
a teacher claiming ownership under the ‘teacher exception.’”25 However,
VerSteeg cautions “it would be unwise to interpret the Hays dicta to mean that
the copyright in and to all educational materials created by teachers should
belong to those teachers.”26 In the end, VerSteeg’s main recommendation is to
create a right of “teacher inception,” whereby in a teacher’s contract, a teacher
and his employer would enter into a “license and accompanying grant,” which
equates to a “shop right” for teacher-created works.27 VerSteeg suggests this
agreement could be accomplished through a collective bargaining
agreement.28 Though reasonable, as will be discussed in Part III, with the
decline of collective bargaining since VerSteeg’s 1990 article and the
unlikelihood that teachers have individual knowledge that such agreements
are wise, VerSteeg’s solution may need a second glance.
Nathanial S. Strauss is one commentator29 who suggests in part of his
2011 article that the exception may have survived the 1976 Act’s enactment.30
To support his suggestion, he cites to federal decisions that have, arguably,

22. Id. at 416–17.
23. It should be noted that these are not the only commentators who have discussed the
teacher exception, but they were selected in part because of their varying opinions on the exception’s
existence. Additionally, it was important to analyze the views of commentators in articles that were
published over several years.
24. See VerSteeg, supra note 8, at 412.
25. Id. at 405.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 410.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus: The First
Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291 (2000);
Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 2009 (2003), for
other commentators who argue that the teacher exception lives on.
30. Strauss, supra note 7, at 24.
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accepted the teacher exception.31 One such decision is Shaul v. Cherry ValleySpringfield Central School District.32 In Shaul, the Second Circuit held a
school employer could assert ownership over materials including “tests,
quizzes, and homework problems” created by a high school teacher who had
since been suspended.33 The Second Circuit did not accept the teacher’s
argument that he owned the materials under the “academic” exception, the
alternative name for the teacher exception,34 but as Strauss notes, “neither did
the court reject it in its entirety.”35 Instead, Strauss emphasizes the Second
Circuit articulated that teaching materials prepared by high school teachers
differed from published articles written by university professors in that
materials not explicitly prepared for publication did not fall within “academic
tradition,” a notion highly protected by court.36 In doing so, Strauss argues,
the Second Circuit did not dismiss the teacher exception, it only narrowed it.37
Yet, Strauss’ analysis of the court’s support for the existence of the teacher
exception rests on the notion that the court did not deny the exception. That
lack of denial, by itself, is unfortunately not enough to justify a teacher’s
reliance on the teacher exception to assert ownership over their work.
Next, Strauss cites to Pavlica v. Behr,38 where the Southern District of
New York found a high school teacher retained copyright ownership of a
teacher’s manual that explained his method of teaching “independent science
research to high-school students,” which was also distributed at workshops
outside the school where he was employed.39 Strauss argues that the “opinion
is significant to the teacher exception equation because it demonstrates that,
even where courts do limit the teacher exception to the university setting, as
Shaul did, K-12 teachers would retain ownership of many of the works they
create.”40 Thus, his argument that the exception may have “lurched back from
death in the 21st century”41 only seems to apply to the university setting.
Strauss argues to maintain ownership, K-12 teachers would only need to
prove the works were created outside the scope of their employment, which
he asserts would be not all that difficult for them to do.42 Furthermore, as with
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See generally id. at 17–24.
363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 186.
Strauss, supra note 7, at 26.
Id.; see Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186.
Strauss, supra note 7, at 26.
397 F.Supp.2d. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 522–23.
Strauss, supra note 7, at 28.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
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Strauss’ analysis of Shaul, Strauss rests the argument that the teacher
exception may have survived the 1976 Act on the premise that the court did
not deny the exception’s existence. While this may be true, the court’s lack of
denial of the exception, as pointed out above, is not enough for teachers to
strictly rely on the teacher exception.
Finally, Strauss states Bosch v. Ball-Kell43 “slammed [the door] wide
open” for the teacher exception.44 There, the court held a professor, and not
the university she worked for, maintained ownership over the course materials
she created.45 The court recognized that different considerations might apply
in cases involving work made for hire situations in an academic setting. 46 As
Strauss notes, the court recognized the Weinstein and Hays decisions,
mentioned above, for their “pronouncements in support of the teacher
exception.”47 In the end, in keeping with its support of the Hays recognition of
the ill fit between the works made for hire doctrine and production of
academic works, the court held that the university’s intellectual property
policy reflected intent that faculty created “course materials, such as syllabi,
notes, etc., were to be included within the general category of traditional
academic copyrightable works”48 that are “owned by their faculty creators
rather than by the university.”49 The Bosch case is noteworthy for its explicit
mention of the exception in awarding a professor ownership to her works.
However, the facts included a university setting and relied on a university
intellectual property policy, a type of policy that most K-12 institutions are
unlikely to have. And those distinguishable facts make it a decision that K-12
teachers should not rely on.
In the end, Strauss concludes his article by proposing that the “teacher
exception” should be called the “academic exception” and “should apply to
scholarly works by teachers, but not to course materials or administrative
works.”50 In his explanation of his proposal, he acknowledges what this
comment insinuated in evaluating his arguments above. That is, that there is
little support that a teacher exception exists for K-12 teachers. In his proposal,
Strauss suggests the proposed exception should not apply to K-12 teachers
based on Shaul’s recognition that “there is no academic tradition granting
control of creative works to teachers,” and Strauss’ opinion is that teachers do
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
Strauss, supra note 7, at 28.
Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1721.
Id. at 1720.
Strauss, supra note 7, at 29.
Bosch, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720.
See Strauss, supra note 7, at 29–30.
Id. at 47.
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not need the exception. 51 Thus, while he argues the exception is alive, his
ultimate proposal for the exception would not apply to K-12 teachers. It is
Strauss’s analysis of the current teacher exception and recognition that his
proposed exception would not apply to K-12 teachers that supports the
necessity of teachers to not rely on the teacher exception to protect their
works.
Finally, some commentators doubt the existence of the teacher
exception.52 In her 2002 article, Ashley Packard asserts that while once
accepted, the notion that the teacher exception continues to exist is
dwindling.53 Such evidence of this is the change in the concept of academic
freedom. In addition to common law support, the notion of academic freedom,
which stands for the proposition that teachers should be entitled to freedom in
their research, classrooms, and speech, has been the crucial support of the
existence of the teacher exception.54 However, Packard notes that while the
United States Supreme Court and lower courts support academic freedom, the
“notions of academic freedom appear to be primarily institutional, rather than
individual in nature.”55 This is evidenced by several cases that praise
academic freedom, but come up short in applying the right to scholars over
universities.56 These cases are not entirely consistent with one another, says
Packard, but that does not alter their adverse impact on professors’ copyright
ownership.57 Since the United States Supreme Court appears to be signaling
that academic freedom belongs to institutions rather than individuals, the
concept of academic freedom cannot be “the legal hook up which to base the
teacher exception,”58 thereby strengthening the argument that the future of the
exception’s existence and reliability is bleak.
Still, twenty-five years after VerSteeg’s article, there is still no clear
51. Id. at 44.
52. See Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They “Works Made for Hire” Under the 1976
Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485 (1983) (suggesting that university professors enter into written
agreement with their employers to guarantee copyright ownership over their materials because they
do not receive automatic ownership over their created intellectual property); see also Michael W.
Klein, “The Equitable Rule”: Copyright Ownership of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L.
143, 167–70 (2005) (concluding that the teacher exception likely has not survived the 1976
Copyright Act revisions based on the current splits in judiciary opinions regarding the existence of
the exception and the impact of the growth of technology, which has encouraged findings that
ownership vests in colleges and universities).
53. Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty
Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (2002).
54. Id. at 287.
55. Id. at 289.
56. Id. at 291.
57. Packard, supra note 53, at 293.
58. Id.
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answer as to the existence of the teacher exception. Many scholars, including
Strauss and Packard, have argued that the exception may or may not exist, but
only one thing remains true since VerSteeg’s article: K-12 teachers simply
cannot rely on the existence of the teacher exception and must look to other
alternatives, such as those discussed in Part III, to protect their copyright
ownership of nontraditional works.
C. Interpretation of the Works Made for Hire Doctrine
If an employer seeks to assert ownership over a teacher-created work,
litigation regarding ownership of the work would involve interpretation of the
work made for hire doctrine. The United States Supreme Court most notably
interpreted the inner workings of the doctrine in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid.59 The court noted that Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides
a work is made for hire if (1) an employee creates a work within the scope of
his employment or (2) the work falls within one of nine enumerated
categories and the parties expressly agree in a written instrument that the
work is made for hire.60
The first circumstance, when an employee creates a work within the scope
of his employment, requires two elements. First, the creator must be an
employee, which can be determined by “using principals of general common
law of agency.”61 The Reid court provided several non-exclusive factors that
are relevant to the inquiry, but, in general, the more control the hiring party
exerts over the hired party’s work, the more likely the hired party is an
employee.62 If the creator is an employee, the second element requires that the
work be created within his scope of employment. What works fall within the
scope “seem to include only those of the types that the employee was hired to
create that can be created within the time and space limits of the employee’s
job and those that are motivated by a purpose which is to specifically serve
the employer’s purposes.”63 As will be discussed in more detail in Part III, in
the case of public K-12 teachers, because they are generally hired under a
contract and the school and governing federal and state laws exert significant
59. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
60. Id. at 738.
61. Id. at 751.
62. Id. at 751–52 (stating relevant factors include “. . . the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the
tax treatment of the hired party.”).
63. Wadley & Brown, supra note 5, at 400.
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control over what they teach, they are employees and ownership of their
created works will be determined by the works made for hire doctrine.64
Two final considerations may impact ownership of a work created by an
employee within the scope of employment. First, Section 201(b) provides that
an employee and his employer can contract around the work made for hire
doctrine if “expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument.”65 This
Section allows for a few alternatives discussed below in Part III. Second,
though this comment argues that teachers should not rely on the teacher
exception, nonetheless, it is important to note that, if applied, the teacher
exception would serve as an exception to ownership by the employer over
works created by a teacher within the scope of his employment.
The second circumstance involves special commissioned works, which
will be made for hire if the work falls within one of the nine enumerated
categories and the parties have a written agreement that the work is made for
hire.66 This situation occurs when a creator is an independent contractor, as
opposed to an employee.67 However, if the work created does not fall within
one of the nine categories or if the work falls within one of the categories but
the parties do not have a written agreement that the work is made for hire, the
work will not be made for hire and ownership will vest in the creator.68 For
teachers, this situation would be extremely rare, but could occur if an outside
employer asked a K-12 teacher who is not employed by the employer, but
would instead be an independent contractor, to create one of the nine
enumerated categories of work, as specified by a written agreement between
the two parties. If this were the case, the work would be one strictly made for
hire, to which the teacher exception could not apply, making the issues
discussed in this article related to the exception’s existence irrelevant.
However, as mentioned above, most teachers will create works as employees,
thereby almost eliminating the need to analyze whether a work was specially
commissioned under the second circumstance.
II. HOW SHOUD TEACHERS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS PROCEED
With the current state of law in mind, a balance must be struck between
64. Id. at 412.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (providing “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”).
67. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
68. See id. at 738.
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teachers protecting their created works and employers retaining ownership
over works they should rightfully own. This is difficult because, as noted
above, the teacher exception has not achieved concrete acceptance for even
very traditional academic created works. Therefore, how can it be known
whether the exception will be applied to nontraditional works, such as degree
programs created by teachers to sell to other institutions? The answer, as
suggested above, is that teachers should not rely on the exception and instead
focus on other alternatives.
A. Contracts and the Works Made for Hire Doctrine
As discussed above, employers of teachers may assert ownership claims
over works created by teachers who are employed by them under the works
made for hire doctrine. Because it is not clear whether nontraditional works,
such as degree program materials created to sell to other institutions, fall
within a teacher’s scope of employment, it is wise for teachers to enter into
written agreements with their employers regarding copyright ownership. The
solution may sound simple, but it is likely not the case, especially in light of
the current state of teacher and school negotiation techniques and the uneven
sophistication of the two parties.
1. Collective Bargaining
If permitted by the state in which a school is located, public teachers and
their employers can enter into written agreements regarding copyright
ownership through collective bargaining. Collective bargaining units are
beneficial to individual teachers because the units are more likely to have the
sophistication and knowledge about various rights, such as a right of teacher
inception or copyright licensing. While all public school teachers have a
constitutional right to join a union because citizens have a constitutional right
to organize, their right to engage in collective bargaining is determined by
individual state’s laws, as there is not a “constitutional right to bargain
collectively.”69
Collective bargaining involves teachers selecting “representatives to
bargain with their employer about ‘wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.’”70 Additionally, states that allow collective
bargaining often have varying requirements about what school boards and
teachers’ representatives can and must negotiate about in terms of “wages,

69. Louis Fischer et al., TEACHERS AND THE LAW 46–47 (Arnis E. Burvikovs et al. eds., 6th
ed. 2003).
70. Id. at 46.
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hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”71 These subjects often
include insurance, fringe benefits, salaries, sick leave, and seniority.
Intellectual property rights are not always included in public K-12 teacher
employment contracts. Thus, in states where collective bargaining is still
allowed, the unions that represent teachers need to be aware of teachers’
intellectual property rights and include them in their bargaining process,
especially as technology continues to increase. The National Education
Association (NEA), the nation’s largest professional union,72 has recognized
in its NEA Policy Statement on Digital Learning that the changing times call
for educators to ensure that “[a]ll students–pre-k through graduate students”
are exposed to and learn about new technology.73 The policy further
recognizes that in this landscape, “teachers, faculty, and staff are becoming
curriculum designers who orchestrate the delivery of content using multiple
instructional methods and technologies both within and beyond the traditional
instructional day.”74 To ensure that students receive this important education,
the NEA asserts that “education employees should own the copyright to
materials that they create in the course of their employment” and that this
“should be resolved through collective bargaining or other bilateral decisionmaking between the employer and the affiliate.”75 The increase in technology
and its impact on intellectual property rights can provide both teachers and
employers with “bargaining chips” to be used in contract negotiations.
Therefore, not only is it an advantage for teacher unions to bring intellectual
property rights into their negotiations, the employers can also use those rights
to negotiate with prospective teachers and their union representatives.
Bargaining over copyright ownership, specifically for a right of teacher
inception, is an option emphasized by VerSteeg in his 1990 article mentioned
above.76 However, more recently, it appears there is a more concentrated
effort to either do away with or reduce collective bargaining rights for public
employees. Currently, five states outlaw collective bargaining for public

71. Id. at 46–47, 53.
72. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/2580.htm (last visited March 23, 2014)
[hereinafter NEA].
73. NEA Policy Statement on Digital Learning, NEA, http://www.nea.org/home/55434.htm
(last visited March 23, 2014).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. VerSteeg, supra note 8, at 410–11. A right of teacher inception “amount[s] to a ‘shop
right’ for works created by teachers.” Through collective bargaining, employers and the teacher’s
union could negotiate a license and accompanying grant to include the right in teachers’ contracts.
The right of teacher inception would give the school “. . . a nonexclusive, nontransferable, royaltyfree license to use the copyrightable [educational] works for nonprofit educational purposes. The
teachers would then hold all other copyrights.”
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sector teachers.77 Other states, such as Idaho, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, have
implemented legislation that dramatically limits the scope of collective
bargaining.78 Thirteen other states apply “right to work” laws to public
employees, which also have the effect of making collective bargaining more
difficult.79 While VerSteeg’s suggestion is a reasonable option if a collective
bargaining unit is representing a group of teachers, the option may not be very
realistic for teachers who must individually negotiate for their contracts.
Those teachers may not have the same knowledge and ability of the
bargaining unit to enter into such agreements individually with their
employers, making VerSteeg’s suggestion less realistic.
While including the subject of copyright ownership rights during
collective bargaining can be a good option for both teachers and their
employers, it is no secret that collective bargaining is often an unpopular
solution. Collective bargaining rights, though not eliminated or minimized in
a majority of states, seem to be under attack across the United States and
when allowed, many teachers and employers are likely not bargaining over
intellectual property rights. Therefore, teachers increasingly have to take a
proactive approach in order to protect their copyright ownership over works
they wish to create.
2. Individual Employee Negotiations
Teachers have two options to engage in a contract negotiations regarding
copyright ownership under the works made for hire doctrine:80
First, ‘the contract could specify that certain types of activities, [such
as employee created programs or degrees intended for sale to other
institutions], will not be considered within the scope of employment.’
Second, ‘the contract could give the teacher rights other than
ownership of the copyright . . . [such as], the employer, which still
owns the copyright, could give the teacher the right to reproduce or
distribute curriculum materials.’81
This process may sound simple, but several hurdles may make these
options unrealistic. First, it is reasonable to assume that copyright ownership

77. Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH,
REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES (March 2014),
http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014–03.pdf.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Louis Fischer et al., supra note 69, at 110.
81. Id.
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and other intellectual property rights are not on the forefront of a teacher’s
mind when entering into an individual contract with an employer.
Additionally, a school employer may not be forthcoming with their employed
teachers about the importance of negotiating for those rights.
School districts likely can and will enlist the help of an attorney in
contract negotiations, but it is unlikely that many teachers will do the same.
Of course, it is not the school district’s or the state’s job to provide legal
advice to teachers who will enter into employment contracts. However, the
state could incorporate more training into the education curriculum of those
studying to be future teachers, such as requiring that prospective teachers
have completed coursework regarding employment contracts. Why would a
state want to do this? By educating employees on their contractual rights,
teachers and employers may be able to enter into better-formed contracts
regarding not just intellectual property rights, but all working conditions, and
ultimately, avoid situations that may lead to disputes or litigation.
Another potential hurdle for teachers are standard form contracts. Many
school districts may use standard form contracts for each of their employees
that may not include intellectual property clauses. Without unions advocating
that intellectual property and other rights are included in contracts, teachers
may face negotiating with their employers to make additions to the standard
form contract or a completely new contract. This process may go smoothly or
it may create conflict between the employer and the teacher from the
beginning of their relationship and perhaps, preclude the relationship from
forming at all.
Not only can a school district work out an agreement to maintain certain
rights pertaining to intellectual property created by its employees, but it can
also avoid unnecessary conflicts or litigation with its employees. Furthermore,
including opportunities for future employees to negotiate their rights may also
help contribute to the positive reputation a school district employer may
receive. In competing for the best educators to employ, a school district would
be wise to promote it has flexibility in its contract formation, specifically in
regards to intellectual property rights that are becoming increasingly
important in the age of rising technology.
Even after beginning employment, a teacher may face another hurdle if
and when he decides to create a nontraditional work, such as degree program
materials to sell to another institution. To avoid potential future disputes, the
teacher could attempt to enter into a written agreement with his employer that
the teacher will have copyright ownership of the materials. Some school
employers may happily agree, but others may not, causing an issue for the
teacher before he even begins to work on his degree program. Overall, this
hurdle may stunt the innovations of the teachers who are depended upon to
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educate others.
In a perfect world, states and school district employers would include a
discussion about intellectual property rights during contract negotiations, even
when using standard contracts, and as suggested, it would not be an unwise
move for those entities to do so. In the absence of state and school district led
discussions, it is up to teachers to advocate for copyright ownership and other
intellectual property rights. As mentioned, teachers may not know those
discussions are important. In the absence of those discussions, disputes may
arise and will be analyzed under the works made for hire doctrine.
B. Teacher’s Scope of Employment
When teachers and their employers have not entered into a copyright
ownership agreement, the works made for hire doctrine will determine
ownership over a teacher-created work. Because teachers should not rely on
the teacher exception to the works made for hire doctrine, teachers will have
to fall back on their next best option by arguing that a nontraditional work,
such as degree program materials, do not fall within the scope of their
employment.
As discussed above, the first circumstance under Section 101 is the most
likely circumstance to arise when ownership of teacher-created works is
disputed. This requires that an employee has created a work within the scope
of his employment. It is almost certain that in every case, a public K-12
teacher will be considered an employee, because they are generally hired
under a contract and the school and governing federal and state laws exert
significant control over what they teach.82
The second prong, whether the work was created within the teacher’s
scope of employment must also be met. It is easy to imagine that “lesson
plans, exams, quizzes, explanatory handouts, outlines, lecture notes,
interoffice communications, e-mail messages, calendar notations, letters of
recommendation for students, peer evaluations, public service presentations,
correspondence with other professionals, reviews” and the like, are tasks a
teacher would likely complete in the course of his employment and could be
copyrighted if the work satisfied the requisite requirements of copyright
ownership.83 It is not a far stretch to conclude that these works are part of a
teacher’s general responsibility and the teacher’s employer may want and may
successfully retain copyright ownership under the work made for hire
doctrine, particularly in relation to materials directly used during the course of

82. See generally Hays, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
83. Wadley & Brown, supra note 5, at 403.
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a teacher’s instruction.84 Less clear are nontraditional works, like those
created by teachers to be sold to other institutions. Thus, it is under this
second prong that teachers have the best opportunity to argue that a
nontraditional work, such as degree program materials, does not fall within
the scope of their employment and as a result, should not be owned by their
employers.
Strauss, in his article, suggests this argument should not be too
challenging for K-12 teachers because their “duties to their schools are
usually clearer than professors’ duties to their universities.”85 While this may
be true for some works, teachers will want to be prepared with evidence that
supports that they did not have a duty to create the disputed work, especially
in light that little precedent exists related to nontraditional teacher-created
works.
Using the example of the degree program materials, before creating this
work, a teacher should consult his position description to determine whether it
includes creating any materials that may be remotely close to a degree
program. When a work does not fall within a position description, the teacher
can argue that the work does not fall within the teacher’s scope of
employment either. Next, a teacher, during the creation of the material should
not accept payment from his employer for any part of the work or solicit any
advice about the work from his employer. If the teacher would do so, the
employer may be able to successfully argue that it directed and exercised
significant control over the work. He also should not solicit advice from other
teachers or they may argue for joint authorship ownership rights.
Additionally, teachers should not work on the materials during work time, at
their place of employment, or using their employer’s resources. All and all, if
a teacher’s work invites a disagreement with his employer or litigation, the
more evidence the teacher has that he did not have the duty to create the work,
the more likely he will be able to successfully argue the work does not fall
within the scope of his employment, and thus, he has sole copyright
ownership over the work.
CONCLUSION
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the acceptance and application of the
so-called “teacher exception,” teachers should not rely on the exception.
Instead, it would be best for teachers to enter into a written agreement with
their employer about copyright ownership rights. Employers would also be
served by entering into contracts with their employees before conflicts arise,
84. See id.
85. Strauss, supra note 7, at 28.
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especially regarding nontraditional teacher-created works that may not easily
fall under the works made for hire doctrine. Teachers who are not aware of
the advantage of entering into written agreements to protect their copyright
ownership would be best served by collective bargaining. However, due to
what seems to be an effort to either reduce or eliminate collective bargaining
rights for their public employees, teachers may have to proactively contract
with their employers individually to protect their copyright ownership rights.
Though entering into written agreements regarding ownership over
copyrightable materials may be the best option to appease both parties, it is
more likely that many teachers are not aware of this option. Without an
agreement, any disputes between a teacher and his employer over copyright
ownership will fall under the work made for hire doctrine. In that case, the
teacher should not rely on the teacher exception, and instead focus on arguing
that his nontraditional created work, such as degree program materials, do not
fall within the scope of his employment, making the work made for hire
doctrine inapplicable and, ultimately, securing copyright ownership of his
work.
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